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Case No. 9176

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GLEN F. HARDING,
Plaintiff and Appellant;

-vs.-

l\1ARY ALLEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

I

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

II
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts are essentially correct,
but as herein supplemented, and in some instances controverted, as follows:
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The fence existing between plaintiff's and defendant's properties had existed in its then location for a
long time prior to December 11, 1937, when defendant
acquired her property. Transcript 74.
At the tin1e of her purchase the fence extended to a
tree approximately 10 to 12 feet east of the west property
line of plaintiff's and defendant's property. Transcript
14, 16, 45, 66, 67, 70, 72 and 81.
Two separate driveways existed at the time defendant purchased her property, one on either side of the
fence line with the fence separating them. Transcript
45. When water was piped into the defendant's hon1e a
hydrant had been placed and continuously thereafter retained on the fence line approximately 30 feet east of the
west property line. Transcript 18, 44.
When the crossover at the curb was constructed for
ingress to and egress from plaintiff's and defendant's
properties prior to 1937, the exact date being unknown,
it was placed, so far as can be determined, exactly onehalf north of the fence line extended to the west and onehalf on the south side thereof, the center being in line with
the fence manifestly for the convenience of the occupants
of the two properties. Transcript 82, 86.
If any presumption can be indulged in, the presumption would be that the crossover was installed in its
present location at the instance of the property owners
and for their convenience, no one else would have any
2
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interest therein or be served thereby. There is no evidence that the owners and occupants of the property on
either side of the fence ever interferred with the use of
the property on the other side of the fence except one of
plaintiff's witnesses indicated an occasional slipping over
on to plaintiff's side slightly south of the fence line when
the driveway was slick. That the fence line, extended
through, as found by the trial court, and was marked by
visible evidence such as fence, monuments, or buildings,
when plaintiff purchased his property, is evidenced by
the fact that in the construction of his buildings and retaining walls he followed through from east to west just
slightly south of the line claimed by the defendant and
that he himself directed or had placed one panel of fence
to replace wire at the west end of the present terminus
shortly after he acquired his property. Transcript 10 and
47, defendant's Exhibit 4. Prior to that he had discussed
the property line with one George Carsons. Transcript
13 and 14. Plaintiff's retaining wall is a permanent concrete wall dug down some distance in the slope and existing approximately 3 to 3lj2 feet north of his commercial
buildings leaving a wall or catwalk for light into basement rooms. Transcript 13 and 14.
The foundation for his garages, being permanent in
nature, were placed continuously on a diagonal direction,
bearing to the south following the fence line and plaintiff
erected a fence along the south side of the property
claimed by defendant of his own volition shortly after he
purchased his property, i.e. in the spring of 1952, or 1953.
3
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Transcript 1-1, 25, 49,' 57. Defendant's Exhibits 1, 3, 5, 6
and 7.
The north wall of a garage or building on the Weller
property, in existence when plaintiff purchased his property, and long prior thereto, was along said fence line and
formed a part of the dividing line. Transcript31, 36, 37,
41, 42, 46, 66, 68 and 69.
Several years prior to plaintiff's acquisition of his
property, in approximately 1946, the then owner of the
east 49V2 feet, Mr. Joseph H. Hunter, plaintiff's grantor,
knew that the fence did not follow the survey line. Plaintiff's predecessor took no steps to change the location of
said fence. Subsequently defendant repaired or partly
replaced said fence on the existing line and Hunter made
no complaint about it. Transcript 89 and 90.

III
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF
FACT AND THE JUDGMENT.

IV
ARGUMENT
It is the law of this state that this court will not dishub the findings and order of the trial tribunal if there
is substantial basis in the evidence to support its action,
Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers of America, Local
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{'nions X o. :2~2 and No. 976, Plaintiffs, versus Board of
Review, Deparhnent of l~mployn1ent Security, of the
Industrial Com1nission of Ftah, et al, defendants, decided
,J~UllUlX)' 20, 1960.
"This court will indulge considerable credit
to the findings of the trial court because of his advantaged position and will not disturb them unless
the evidence clearly preponderates against the
findings."
Peterson vs. Holloway, 8 Ut. 2nd 328 334 P. 2d 559.
Nathan G. Chugg vs. Dale Chugg et al., 7-20-59.
A consideration of all the evidence in the case makes
it clear and convincing that it was generally known that
the fence line which has existed for more th~n 20 years
prior to the filing of plaintiff's complaint ran on a bias
to the south and not due east and west as shown by the
deeds; that all of the occupants of the land on both sides
of that fence line knew of its existence and recognized it
as the dividing line since prior to defendant's acquisition
of her property. There is no evidence that anyone ever
attempted to change that dividing line. While it appears
to be true that IIunter, plaintiff's predecessor, did not
occupy the east 491f2 feet of plaintiff's property as a
home, he nevertheless occupied it in the sense that he actually and actively maintained, controlled and considered
it and shortly after acquiring it in 1946, had it surveyed.
Something it must he assumed, about the fence line must
have indicated to him a doubt as to the location of the
true line because he had it surveyed and discovered then
5
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that it was not on the fence line. He called ti1at fact to
defendant's attention but made no move or effort to
change or relocate the fence - notwithstanding repairs
to and replacement of parts thereof shortly thereafter
made. And by his very actions, or failure to act, acquiesced in its then location..
His knowledge of the facts and his acquiescence
therein are imputed to his grantee (plaintiff) Hummell
et al vs. Young et al, 1 U t. 2nd 237, 265 P. 2d 410. The evidence is conclusive that there was acquiescence in the
fence line established for more than 20 years prior to the
filing of this action with full knowledge that the fence
was not upon the true line since 1946, 11 years prior to
the filing of the suit. Hunter acquiesced by taking no
action to change the location. His grantee, plaintiff, acquiesced by installing permanent and costly construction
completely along and immediately south of the fence
line from east to west. l\1rs. Weller, plaintiff's predecessor to the west 66 feet, acquiesced as did Spendlove,
her predecessor, in the use and operation of the two driveways, one on either side of the fence between the two
properties down to within 10 or 12 feet of the west line
and in the installation and use of the crossover for ingress to and egress from their respective properties on
the west.
This court said in Ekberg vs. Bates, 239 P. 2d 205:
"We further pointed out in Bro·wn vs l\1illiner
Supra (232 P. 2nd 202 added) that in the absence
of evidence that the owners of adjoining property
6
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,

or their predecessors in interest, ever made an
expn'~~ agreernent to the location of the boundary
between them, if they have occupied their respective pre1nises up to an open boundary line visibly
marked by momtments, fences or buildings for a
long period of time and mut1tally recognized it as
the dividing line between them. The law will imply
an agreement fixing the boundary as located if it
can do so consistently with the facts appearing and
it will not pennit the parties nor their grantees to
depart from such line." (Italics ours.)
''This is so because the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence rests on sound public policy of
avoiding trouble and litigation over boundaries."
This rule is sometimes referred to as the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescence. The rule is recognized and
implied in Holmes vs Judge, 87 P. 1009, and in a long
line of subsequent cases all cited in Brown vs. Milliner,
120 Ut. 16, 232 Pac. (2) 202-7. Briem vs. Smith, 112 P.
2d 145, Jensen vs. Bartlett, 4 U t.
2nd 58, 286 Pac. 2nd
80-t.
The court further said in the Hummell case :
"The court in such cases indulges in the fiction that at some time in the past the adjoining
owners were in dispute or uncertain as to the
location of the true boundary and that they settled
their differences by agreeing upon the fence or
other monument as the dividing line between the
properties."
Certainly that fiction can and should be indulged in in
the instant case "consistently with the facts appearing:'
7
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rrhere is no evidence to the contrary, and by so indulging
in such fiction no violence will be done to any evidence.
It seems to the writer that no other presumption could
be reached under the evidence down to the filing of the
action which occurred at a date 1nany years after such
presumption arose by reason of the actions of the adjoining property owners.
This court listed as. a requisite to acquiescence "mutual recognition." Brown vs Milliner Supra. Acquiescence for a period of 8 years was held sufficient to satisfy
the rule establishing fence lines as a property line in
Ekberg vs. Bates, 239 P. 2d 205. The court saying in part:
"In the instant case, as we have pointed out
above, there was a period of actual acquiescence
for more than 7 years (the Utah limitations period
for adverse possession) before appellant's acquired their title and under all the circu1nstances
shown herein that was a sufficient length of time
to establish the line so that appellants are precluded from claiming that it is not the true line."
The language of this court in the case of Holmes vs.
Judge, Supra, indicates that the presumption of an agreement under the fiction of acquiescence may not be rebutted and it is further indicated in other cases decided
by this court that "in all cases" where the previously
noted pre-requisites are present, a binding boundary
agreement will be implied. True, these statements may
be dicta but indicate the thinking of this court, Farr Development Company vs. Thomas, 41 lTt. 1. 122 P. 906,

8
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where quoting from the Holmes vs. Judge case Supra,
this court said :
"\Ye said all that is necessary to be or that
can be said by us on the question that where owners of adjoining lands have occupied the respective
pren1ises up to a certain line which they and their
predecessors in interest recognized or acquiesced
in as their boundary line for a long period of time
neither they nor their grantees or privies in estate
will be pennitted to deny that the boundary line so
recognized and acquiesced in is the true line of
division between their properties."
See also Banford vs. Eccles, 51 U 453, 126 P. 333, Young
v. Highland, 37 Utah 229, 108 P. 1124, Moyer vs. Langton, 37 U 9, 106 P. 508.
No good could be served now to compel the establishment of a different division line. Appellant has constructed costly and permanent buildings and walls along
the fence line. It would be ridiculous to suppose that he
would go to the expense of reconstructing these buildings
andjor walls if he should prevail in this appeal. The most
that would be accomplished would be to save face in
having filed the action, and to jeopardize respondent's
property by making it impossible of ingress to and egress
frmn and cause bitterness and bickering between the
parties, which this court has sought to avoid. Holmes vs.
Judge, 31 Ut. 269, 87 P. 1009, Blanchard vs: Smith, 255
P. 2d 729.

9
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v
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the facts
and the law amply support the findings, conclusions and
judgment of the trial court and that they should be
affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

HUGGINS & HUGGINS
IRA A. HUGGINS
Attorneys for Respondent
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